A pro t-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may h a v e non-empty i n tersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group with the highest sum of the agents' bids, only if this sum exceeds a minimum price declared previously by the auctioneer. For the one-group two-bidder case with private values drawn from a uniform distribution we c haracterize the continuously di erentiable symmetric equilibrium bidding functions for the agents, and nd the optimal minimum price for the auctioneer when such functions are used by the bidders. We also examine another interesting family of equilibrium bidding functions for this case, with a discrete number of possible bids, and show the relation in the limit to the di erentiable bidding functions.
Introduction
We consider a number of groups of agents competing for a prize which can be allocated to at most one of the groups. The groups are not necessarily disjoint. The prize is a public good for members of a group; each can enjoy the prize as if she were the sole owner. The motivation for this problem is the allocation of a license to use a certain range of frequencies for local radio broadcasts. Until recently, such licenses in the US were allocated by the Federal Communications Commission, without cost to the licensees. Coase 1959 advocated that such licenses should be subject to competitive bidding, a view taken also in Meckling 1968 . However, such procedures have only recently been started see McMillan, 1994. We model the following situation. Instead of providing a license for a frequency range to a single user, it can be provided to a group of broadcasters who are geographically located in such a w a y that their broadcasts do not interfere with each other. We can describe the situation as a graph. The nodes of the graph are the potential broadcasters, and an arc connects any t w o broadcasters that cannot broadcast simultaneously without interference. A license to broadcast can therefore be assigned to any independent set of this graph and the license is a public good for members of such a set. This model was studied in Lerner 1996 , where a noncooperative solution concept was used to divide the license among the maximal independent sets of nodes. In the case dealt with by Lerner, no payment is extracted from the broadcasters, and the solution is a function only of the structure of the groups.
We make the following informational assumptions on the situation. Each agent broadcaster has a private value for the good being assigned to each group this value is zero for groups that the agent does not belong to. We assume that each agent d o e s not know the valuations of other agents for the prize to be awarded to di erent groups. They know only the probability distribution from which these valuations were drawn. The other main assumption is that the provider of the prize is a pro t maximizer. If the provider knew the private values, she could of course o er the prize to the group with the highest sum of values, obtaining an e cient outcome while extracting their entire surplus. However, since the values are not known to the provider, other methods must be used, and e ciency is lost in the quest for pro t maximization 1 .
We examine an auction situation with the following procedure. The provider states a minimum price at which the good will be provided. Every agent bids simultaneously how m uch she is willing to pay for each group to be assigned the object 2 . If the group with the maximum sum of bids has bid a sum exceeding the minimum price ties are broken randomly, then the good is provided to the group, and each agent p a ys her bid for that group.
The informational asymmetries of our assumptions make the equilibrium analysis of this situation mathematically complex even for relatively simple situations. Since this paper is a rst attempt to solve such models, we will make many simplifying assumptions 3 . Even with these assumptions the problem is not trivial. We describe a general model, but most of our analysis is restricted to one of the simplest cases possible two agents who belong to one group. Each agent has a private value independently drawn from a uniform distribution over the unit interval. We t h us sidestep the problems of multiple and non-disjoint groups. The possibility of free riding remains, as each agent w ould prefer the other to bear the cost of bidding the minimum price.
Our model is related both to the theory of public goods and to that of auctions. However, it seems that it has not been previously addressed by either stream of literature. Auctions with incomplete information where the object is awarded according to the sum of bids are a novelty; similarly the provision or non-provision of a public good with the aim of pro t maximizing replacing the quest for e ciency.
There are many related works containing some aspects of our model. None of them deal with non-empty i n tersections of groups 4 , and most do not assume incomplete information or pro t-maximizing providers. We rst address the public goods literature. Much is known about provision of public goods to agents with private values, and the consequent problem of free riding. This problem was rst mentioned in Samuelson 1954 . Other theoretical papers on free riding are Olson 1965 , Stigler 1974 , Brubaker 1975 and Cornes and Sandler 1984 . Some experimental works on free riding are Schneider 1 We elaborate on the incompatibility of e ciency and pro t maximizing in Section 6. 2 An agent will of course bid zero for any group to which she does not belong. 3 These are similar to the assumptions made in Landsberger et al 1996, who investigate a novel auction situation and nd technical di culties even in the two-bidder case. 4 Which w e include in the model but do not solve. One such situation is discussed in Section 6. Groves-Ledyard 1977 mechanism can elicit truthful declarations of private values and therefore achieve ecient allocations, but has a number of limitations. The most problematic of these is that to achieve budget balance the Groves-Ledyard strategies depend on the actions of other players, thus necessitating much information about the preferences of others. As they note, their mechanism is not practical to implement. For our assumption that the provider wishes to maximize her expected income, and does not care directly about e ciency, this class of mechanism is completely unsuitable.
The rent-seeking literature contains a number of related works. In Baik 1993 and in Katz, Nitzan and Rosenberg 1991, groups compete to win group-speci c public goods. In Nitzan 1991 groups compete to win group-speci c private goods. These three papers di er from our analysis as the valuations of the outcomes are common knowledge among all bidders, and bids are paid even by the losers rent seeking. Loehman, Quesnel and Babb 1996 analyze such a model in an experimental situation.
As in standard auctions, the bidders in our setting must take i n to account for each group to which they belong that the bids of other members of the group also count i n determining whether the group will get the good. However, contrary to the situation of auctions of private goods, if other members of one of a bidder's groups make higher bids, this increases the bidder's chances of pro ting from the good through this group. The externalities the good provides are thus positive. Auctions with negative externalities have been dealt with by Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti 1994 and by Jehiel and Moldovanu 1996. Auctions with negative externalities are simpler to analyze, since there is no problem of free riding. McA ee and McMillan 1992 model collusion in bidding cartels, which can be viewed as a case of auctions with positive externalities, as the pro ts from collusion are distributed among the cartel members. The bidders in their model can reach e cient outcomes, but they require punishments to enforce collusive agreements, and the collusion decreases the auctioneer's pro ts.
Even with our simplifying restrictions two bidders and one group we cannot provide a unique prediction or prescription of a solution. We describe an outcome in which the provider chooses a speci c minimum price and the agents then use symmetric equilibrium functions from private values to bids. These equilibrium bidding strategies are drawn from a family of continuously di erentiable functions and are uniquely determined by the minimum price. These functions are in general quite complicated, but at the optimal minimum price for the provider the function reduces to a simple linear function of the private value 5 . W e justify this emphasis on di erentiable bidding strategies in Section 6. We also examine other symmetric equilibrium bidding functions, including a family of functions with discrete bids a reasonable assumption when there is a smallest monetary unit, which tend to the di erentiable functions when the number of possible bids tends to in nity.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. In Section 3 we present the conditions for Nash equilibria of the auction situation, and give properties of such equilibria for the one-group two-bidder case. Sections 4 characterizes di erentiable symmetric equilibrium bidding functions, and Section 5 analyzes a family of discrete ones. We conclude with nal remarks in Section 6.
The Model
We assume a public good which can be provided by a provider in at most one of a number of forms J = f1; 2; : : : ; k gto a group of agents N = f1; 2; : : : ; n g . F or the broadcasting license example, the forms are the maximal independent sets of the graph. Each agent i has a private value v j i for each form of the good j which is independently drawn from a distribution F j i over 0; v . For the case of the broadcasting license, if agent i belongs to group j, then v j i has positive probability of being strictly positive. We denote by v i the vector v j i j2J The procedure of the auction is as follows: At stage 1, the provider of the good, the auctioneer, states a minimum price a 2 IR + . Then, at stage 2, after hearing the value of a, each agent i submits a bid b j i 2 0; v this restriction is without loss of generality, as any higher bid is dominated by a bid in this range for each group S j . The bids are made simultaneously. If max j2J 
Nash Equilibria of the Auction
Any predicted or prescribed outcome should be a Nash equilibrium, as otherwise at least one player could gain from a unilateral deviation. Such a player, being aware of the prediction, would not follow it and the prediction or prescription would not be useful. Therefore, we are interested only in strategy pro les that are Nash equilibria.
Denote by S j the event that the good is provided in form j. The conditions for a pro le a; b i i2N to be a Nash equilibrium are the following: Note that P j2J P r S j j a; b i i2N m a y be less than 1, if there is a positive probability that no form j generates bids summing to at least a. This could occur even in equilibrium.
From this point, we make some simplifying assumptions which will enable us to continue with a more tractable model. As mentioned in the introduction, even with these assumptions the problem is not trivial. We assume that there are two agents, there is one form of the public good, and the question is therefore whether or not it will be provided and at what cost to the agents. We assume that the private values of the good to the agents are independently uniformly distributed over the interval 0; 1 . These assumptions are xed for the remainder of the paper 6 Except in Section 6, where we discuss a two-group case with a non-empty i n tersection.
A remark on the notation. The bidding functions are used after a is announced. Therefore, we rst concentrate on the properties of the bidding functions for a given, xed a, and abuse notation by referring to b i v i instead of b i a; v i . We later return to the question of nding the optimal value of a, when given a family of bidding functions, one for each possible value of a. Note that even if b 1 a; v 1 The following lemmas show some general properties that equilibrium bidding pro les must satisfy. The rst lemma deals with cases where a bidder cannot make a positive pro t with any bid, given her private value and the other bidder's bidding function. The next lemma shows that equilibrium bidding functions must be non-decreasing. The restriction that the following lemma applies only for private values at which i t i s possible to receive a positive p a y o is implied by Lemma 1. Proof: Assume the claim is not true, i.e. there exist such x; x 0 and y, but no such ". Then there exists a sequence ft n g 1 n=1 and a sequence fv n g 1 n=1 , such that bv n = t n for all n, t n a , y for all n, and lim n!1 t n = a,y. De ne, for all n, b ,1 t n = inffxjbx = t n g . F or all n, w e h a v e v n , t n 1 , x 00 v n , t n P w t n ; b ; 10 since t n a , y implies P w t n ; b 1 ,x 00 , and v n , t n P w t n ; b v n ,t n 1 , x 0 ; 11 since b is in equilibrium. Combining 10 and 11 we get v n , t n 1 , x 00 v n , t n 1 , x 0 ; 12 which implies a , y , t n v n x 00 , x 0 + a , y x 0 , t n x 00 : Since b is increasing, so is b ,1 , and the bid at the limit is at least as high as the private value there, in contradiction to Lemma 4. Lemma 5
We h a v e t h us shown that for symmetric equilibrium bidding functions, existence of a plateau in the relevant" area above a , d implies existence of a jump in the function.
Therefore, if such a bidding function is continuous has no jumps, it is strictly increasing for values in the range a , d; 1 .
Di erentiable Symmetric Equilibria
In this section we c haracterize the Nash equilibria for the two agents, given the minimum selling price a announced by the auctioneer, with the restriction that the two agents use the same bidding function, and the bidding function is di erentiable over its entire range. This assumption of di erentiability can actually be considerably weakened, and assuming continuity allows us to derive di erentiability as a result. 
we h a v e that a continuous symmetric equilibrium function satisfying b1 = a is both strictly increasing and di erentiable on 0; 1, and an analogous result holds on a , b1; 1 when b1 a .
Di erentiable Symmetric Equilibria with b1 = a
W e consider rst the case where b1 = a the case b1 a will be dealt with in Section 4.2. Assuming that b is di erentiable, it is strictly increasing from Lemma 5.
Therefore, there exists a unique inverse b ,1 : 0 ; a , ! 0; 1 . We start with Condition 9, which is a necessary condition for any symmetrical equilibrium.
Note that since v i is uniformly distributed over the unit interval, P r b v , i + x a = P r v , i b , 1 a,x = 1 , b , 1 a , x , hence di erentiable with respect to x. Since we assume that b is di erentiable, a necessary condition for Condition 9 to hold is that the derivative of the right hand side of the condition is equal to zero for any x in the argmax. Equating this derivative to zero gives b ,1 0 a , x = 1 , b , 1 Examples of di erentiable symmetric equilibrium bidding functions, with b1 = a, are given in Figure 1 . Note that for a = 1 2 , the di erentiable symmetric equilibrium bidding function is bv = v 2 , a simple linear function of the private value. Such a m ultiplicative bidding function is extremely easy to use. The following calculations show that this is not the only advantage of having a = 1 2 : it is also the optimal choice by the auctioneer, if the bidders use the di erentiable bidding functions characterized by Theorem 1. Next we compute the expected payo each agent receives for di erent v alues of the announced price a, if they both use the symmetrical di erentiable bidding function derived in this section. In general, the payo function for each agent i s A graph of the expected payo for each agent when both use the symmetrical di erentiable bidding function is given in Figure 3 .
When the auctioneer chooses a = 0 : 5, the bidders have an ex-ante expected pro t of 1 6 , using their equilibrium bidding functions bv = v 2 .
Di erentiable Symmetric Equilibria with b1 a
In this section we seek symmetric equilibrium bidding functions when a Using the same method as in Theorem 1, it can be shown that the unique function c satisfying the above requirements is given by ct is equal to the left derivative of c ,1 there. 5 Step Equilibria
In actual auctions, bids are not real numbers but amounts of money. Each bid must be an integer multiple of a smallest unit. This motivates the approach in this section. We now examine a family of non-di erentiable equilibria parameterized by the number of discontinuities. The limit, as the number of discontinuities goes to in nity, is a di erentiable bidding function as described in the previous section. Therefore, as long as the basic unit of money is small enough, the results of the previous section are approximately Proof: Assume c k v c k+1 . Thus, b s v = ka s . It is obvious that under the assumption that the other agent is using the bidding function b s , a n y bid which is not a multiple of a s is dominated by a bid that is such a m ultiple. We need to show that the expected payo from bidding b s v is at least as good as the expected gain from bidding any other multiple of a s . The proof will be by induction. After simplifying, we are left with v c k,m+1 which is true from our assumptions. Thus we h a v e shown that bidding ka s is no worse than anything smaller. Similarly, it can be shown that this bid is no worse than anything larger.
Theorem 3 The following lemma shows that for a step bidding function that is a symmetric equilibrium, with an even number of steps s, the value of c s=2 must be equal to a. Using this fact and a recursive algorithm, a computer program enabled us to calculate the values of the other c i 's for any e v en s. W e also calculated equilibria for low o d d s 's by using brute force in solving Equation 64 for such s's, with the constraints that the c i 's are increasing and between 0 and 1. 6 Concluding Remarks
We conclude with some remarks and directions for future research.
1. There are a number of justi cations for our emphasis on di erentiable bidding functions. 2. When the good is a public good for a group of participants, it seems reasonable in an auction setting to allow the whole group to pay their bids, as once the good is provided it bene ts all members of the group 8 . This is the basis for the auction mechanism that we use, in which the good is provided to the group with the highest sum of bids if this sum exceeds a minimum price declared by the auctioneer.
